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HOW STRICT IS THE MANUFACTURER'S
LIABILITY? RECENT DEVELOPMENTS*
WALTER H. E. JAEGER**
I. INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this article is to examine the extent to which the
manufacturer is strictly liable for injuries caused by his defective
product. Traditionally, where the injured plaintiff was able to prove
negligence, recovery could be had in tort.' In recent times, liability for
breach of express, implied, or constructive warranties has been greatly
expanded.2 And it has even been suggested that as to certain categories
* This article is based upon an address on products liability sponsored by the
Student Bar Association of 'Marquette University Law School and given be-
fore its student body.
** Professor of Law and formerly Director of Graduate Research, Georgetown
University Law Center; chairman of the Publications Committee and editor
of the Newsletter, General Practice Section, American Bar Association;
member of the bars of the District of Columbia and of the Supreme Court
of the United States; author-editor, Williston on Contracts, Third Edition.
' MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
2 Any number of articles have dealt with this expanding liability. Among them
may be mentioned: Bohlen, Liability of Manufacturers to Persons Other
Than Their Immediate Vendees, 45 L. Q. REv. 343 (1929) ; Calabresi, Some
Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L. J. 499
(1961) ; Condon, Progress of Products Liability Law, 31 N.Y.S. B. BULL. 119
(1959); Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers and Vendors, 10 MINN. L.
REv. 1 (1925) ; Feezer, Tort Liability of Manufacturers, 19 MINN. L. REv. 752
(1935) ; Fricke, Personal Injury Damages in Products Liability, 6 VILL. L.
REv. 1 (1960); Ehrenzweig, Products Liability in the Conflict of Laws, 69
YALE L. J. 794 (1960) ; Gillam, Products Liability in a Nutshell, 37 OR. L.
REv. 119 (1958) ; Green, Should the Manufacturer of General Products Be
Liable Without Negligencef 24 TENN. L. REv. 928 (1957) ; Hotes, Advertised-
Product Liability, 8 CLE.-MAR. L. REv. 81 (1959); Jaeger, Privity of War-
ranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1 DUQUESNE L. REv. 1 (1963) ; Jaeger, War-
ranties of Merchantability and Fitness for Use: Recent Developments, 16
RUTGERS L. REV. 493 (1962) ; James, General Products-Should Manufacturers
Be Liable Without Negligence? 24 TENN. L. REv. 923 (1957); James, The
Liability of Manufacturers for Faulty Goods, J. Bus. L. 287 (1960);
Jeanblanc, Manufacturers' Liability to Persons Other Than Their Immediate
Vendees, 24 VA. L. REv. 134 (1937) ; Lucey, Liability Without Fault and the
Natural Law, 24 TENN. L. REv. 952 (1957); Morris, Enterprise Liability and
the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance of Foresight, 70 YALE L. J. 554
(1961); Noel, Strict Liability of Manufacturers, 50 A.B.A.J. 446 (1964);
Noel, Manufacturers' Negligence of Design or Directions for Use of a Pro-
duct, 71 YALE L. J. 816 (1962), discussed in Keeffe, Practicing Lawyer's
Guide to the Current Law Magazines, 49 A.B.A.J. 109 (1963); Noel, Manu-
facturers of Products-The Drift Toward Strict Liability, 24 TENN. L. REv.
963 (1957) ; Plant, Strict Liability of Manufacturers for Injuries Caused by
Defects in Products, 24 TENN. L. REv. 938 (1957); Prosser, The Assault
Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L. J. 1099
(1960) ; Rossi, The Cigarette-Cancer Problem: Plaintiffs Choice of Theories
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of goods, the tort liability of the manufacturer should be strict,3 even
verging on the absolute.4 But even with all the pressure, and the tre-
mendous attention being focussed upon the manufacturer's liability,
there are still ways and means whereby it may be avoided.5 A number
of these will be explored in the course of this discussion; primary
emphasis will be on the more recent cases.
If the action is brought in tort, the law requires that the plaintiff
prove his case in negligence and if he fails, judgment will be given for
the manufacturer. As sustaining this burden is often fraught with
difficulty, the manufacturer enjoys a certain immunity even where his
defective product causes injury. Furthermore, in some jurisdictions
the manufacturer is permitted to show contributory negligence and
assumption of risk to defeat plaintiff's action.
When it comes to warranty, the traditional lack of privity which
was also available in the earlier cases in tort is still available in many
jurisdictions whether the warranty be express, implied-in-fact, or con-
structive. In addition, the express disclaimer and merger provisions
often save the manufacturer harmless. And a failure to give timely
notice has defeated what might otherwise have been valid claims.
This leads to the conclusion that although much is being said and
written about the "strict" liability of the manufacturer, the compre-
hensive protection of the user or consumer of defective products that
would result therefrom is far from achievement.
II. TORT LIABILITY
In the decade which followed the ill-starred decision in Winter-
bottom v. Wright,6 the judge-made obiter dicta requirement of privity
impeded recovery of damages claimed because of injuries suffered by
the plaintiff's use of defective goods.' However, in Thomas v. Win-
Explored, 34 So. CAL. L. R. 399 (1961) ; Russell, Manufacturers' Liability to
the Ultimate Consumer, 21 Ky. L. J. 388 (1933); Ruud, Manufacturers'
Liability for Representations Made by Their Sales Engineers to Subpurchasers,
8 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 251 (1961) ; Skeel, Advertised-Product Liability, 8 CLEV.-
MAR. L. REV. 2 (1959); Spruill, Privity of Contract as a Requisite for Re-
covery on Hlarranty, 19 N.C. L. REV. 551 (1941); Willis, Product Liability
Without Fault, 15 FooD DRUG CosNii. L. J. 648 (1960) ; Wilson, Prolucts
Liability, 43 CALIF. L. REv. 614 (1955). A comprehensive bibliography on
products liability has been published in 7 PRAC. LAW. 70 (May 1961).
3 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 377
P. 2d 897 (1962); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 391
P. 2d 168 (1964), affirming 33 Cal. Rptr. 175, 34 Cal. Rptr. 723 (Cal. App.
1963).
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964),
where the extension of strict liability as to products other than those "for
intimate bodily use" is approved. In this connection, see 7 NACCA News
Letter, No. 6, July 1964, p. 159.
4Green v. American Tobacco Co., 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
5 As for example, disclaimer, notice, and "forum shopping."610 Mees. & W. 109, 11 L.J. Ex. A15, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
7What adds to the irony of this judicially created requirement is that the
Winterbottom case involved neither a manufacturer nor a retailer. The de-
fendant was a contractor who supplied mail coaches to the Postmaster Gen-
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chester, the court early recognized the inequity of this doctrine and
disregarded the so-called requirement.9 The manufacturer was held
liable to a consumer where a bottle of belladonna had been mislabelled
"dandelion," causing injury to the plaintiff. Some fifty years later, in
Huset v. T. L Case Threshing Mach. Co.,' 0 a federal court declared
that a party who makes or sells "an article of merchandise designed
and fitted for a specific use is liable to the person who, in the natural
course of events, uses it for the purpose for which it was made or
sold, for an injury which is the natural and probable consequence of
the negligence of the manufacturer or vendor in its construction or
sale.""
But the real expansion in consumer protection was initiated by the
classic pronouncement in MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co.,", made by
the Court of Appeals of New York: "The question to be determined
is whether the defendant owed a duty of care and vigilance to any one
but the immediate purchaser."'13 Answering its own question, the court
added this oft-quoted statement: "We have put aside the notion that
the duty to safeguard life and limb, when the consequences of negli-
gence may be foreseen, grows out of contract and nothing else. We
have put the source of the obligation where it ought to be. We have
put its source in the law."' 4
The next half century saw the well-nigh universal elimination of
the alleged privity requirement in at least three categories of tort
actions:
eral for the carriage of mail bags from one locality to another and also under-
took to keep the mail coaches in a fit, proper, safe, and secure condition for
this purpose. Plaintiff Winterbottom was a coachman whose services were
engaged by a third party who had a contract with the Postmaster General
to carry the mail. While Winterbottom was driving the mail coach, the coach
broke down, throwing him from his seat and causing him to be injured for
life. The plaintiff declared that he had relied on the contract between the
Postmaster General and defendant whereby the latter had undertaken to keep
the mail coaches in a proper state of repair. This duty having been violated
by the defendant Wright, plaintiff Winterbottom sought judgment in the amount
of his damages. The court sustained the defendant's demurrer since plaintiff
could establish no privity.
Chief Baron Abinger declared that if Winterbottom was found to have
a right of action, then "every passenger, or even any person passing along
the road, who is injured by the upsetting of the coach" could sue; by way
of dictum, he observed that there was "no privity of contract between these
parties," and therefore defendant should have judgment.
Sharing this view, Baron Alderson was of the opinion that if the plain-
tiff could sue, "there is no point at which such actions would stop." He con-
cluded that "the only safe rule is to confine the right to recover to those who
enter into the contract."
8 6 N.Y. 397 (1852).
9 Many of the subsequent cases will be found in FRUMER & FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS
LIABILrrY (1961), and HURsH, AMERICAN LAW OF PRODUCTS LIABILITY (1961).
'0 120 Fed. 865 (8th Cir. 1903).
"1 Id. at 867.
12 217 N.Y. 332, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
13 Id. at 335, 111 N.E. at 1051.
'4 Id. at 390, 111 N.E. at 1053.
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1. Products of an inherently dangerous or harmful char-
acter;
2. Defective goods that are imminently dangerous; and
3. Where fraud or deceit is present.
While the courts are in substantial agreement that the absence of
privity is no bar to the maintenance of actions falling within any of
the aforementioned groups, there is anything but uniformity in the
answers given to the question: What is negligence? Many of the cases
hold that the mere presence of a noxious substance in food or drink
will establish a prima facie case of negligence;1" nevertheless, a number
of jurisdictions still allow the manufacturer to overcome this by a
showing of due care and the possibility of the introduction of the
foreign substance by an intermediate wholesaler, retailer, or other third
party. 6 This works to the greatest advantage of manufacturers or
bottlers of certain types of beverages.' 7 This is recognized as an acute
difficulty and comprehensively discussed in the astute opinion rendered
in Manzoni v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.'8 by Justice Smith of the Su-
preme Court of Michigan.' 9
A number of courts have considered res ipsa loquitur as a means
of amplifying the liability of the manufacturer. 0 Here, circumstantial
evidence has increasingly been the basis for affording recovery. Greater
'5 Dr. Pepper Co. v. Brittain, 234 Ala. 548, 176 So. 286 (1937) ("a black sub-
stance," possibly a fly, which was unwholesome) ; Alabama Coca-Cola Bottling
Co. v. Smith, 29 Ala. App. 324, 195 So. 560 (1940) (beverage containing spider) ;
Gardner v. Sumner, 40 Ala. App. 340, 113 So. 2d 523 (1959) (root beer con-
tained piece of cigar); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Cromwell, 203 Ark. 933,
159 S.W. 2d 744 (1942) (insect legs resembling those of a spider, judgment
for plaintiff affirmed) ; Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Todd, 101 So. 2d 34
(Fla. 1958) (foreign substance); Cordell v. Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co.
56 Ga. App. 117, 192 S.E. 228 (1937) (beverage contained flies); Patargias
v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E. 2d 162 (1947) (contain-
ing mouse); Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 363 Mich. 235, 109
N.W. 2d 918 (1961) ("mold spores"); Migliozzi v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 51
N.J. Super. 313, 144 A. 2d 1 (1958) (foreign substance) ; Smith v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 152 Pa. Super. 445, 33 A. 2d 488 (1943) (spider) ; Wichita Coca-
Cola Bottling Co. v. Tyler, 288 S.W. 2d 903 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956) (mouse);
cf. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Negron Torres, 255 F. 2d 149 (1st Cir. 1958);
Jackson Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chapman, 106 Miss. 864, 64 So. 2d 791
(1914) ; Caskie v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 373 Pa. 614, 96 A. 2d 901 (1953),
citing Rozumailski v. Philadelphia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 296 Pa. 114, 145
Atl. 700 (1929).
16 Nickols v. Continental Baking Co., 34 F. 2d 141 (3d Cir. 1929) (dead cockroach
in loaf of bread, but defendant showed due care in making loaf).
1' Sanders v. Nehi Bottling Co., 30 F. Supp. 332 (D. Tex. 1939) (ginger ale
bottle) ; Stewart v. Crystal Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 50 Ariz. 60, 68 P. 2d
952 (1937) (bottle exploded); Trust v. Arden Farms Co., 50 Cal. 2d 217,
324 P. 2d 583 (1958); Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Rowland, 16 Tenn. App.
184, 66 S.W. 2d 272 (1932).
18 363 Mich. 235, 109 N.W. 2d 918 (1961).
19Discussed in Jaeger, Privity of W'arranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded. 1
DUQUESNE L. REv. 1, 84 (1963).2 0 This aspect is discussed in Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 33 Cal. Rptr. 175
(Ct. App. 1963) ; State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber, Inc.,
252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W. 2d 449 (1961) ; and Grant v. Malkerson Sales, Inc.,
259 Minn. 419, 108 N.W. 2d 347 (1961).
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and greater inroads have been made upon the requirement of "exclusive
management and control" by the manufacturer; and no matter how
much care has been displayed in the course of manufacture, the fact
that the bottle has exploded, in the absence of fault, negligence, or
mishandling by the plaintiff, is a sufficient basis for a number of courts
to allow a recovery in tort. This has been extended to instances where
the mere presence of an unwholesome or deleterious substance in a
product intended for human use or consumption is deemed to speak
for itself.21 But as will be noted, there is a wide divergence in the
manner in which the doctrine is applied and many jurisdictions still
adhere to the view that once the manufacturer or processor proves due
care, he cannot be held liable.22 Yet, the trend is unmistakably in the
direction of greater consumer protection.23
In addition to the question as to what constitutes negligence, there
is a further inquiry as to when is a product "dangerous." The "im-
minently or inherently dangerous" characterization has become very
broad,24 and covers a wide range of products.2 These run all the way
from a coffee urn whose defective handle resulted in burns to the
user,2 6 to a common hair comb.2 7 Yet, on the other band, some defec-
tively made .products which have resulted in injury have not been
deemed within the exception. Thus, where a woman's shoe had a high
heel which caused injury, the court found that the heel would not be
21 Canada Dry Ginger Ale Co. v. Jochum, 43 A. 2d 42 (Munic. Ct. App. D.C.
1945); Eisenbeiss v. Payne, 42 Ariz. 262, 25 P. 2d 162 (1933) (doctrine
applied where putrified mouse was found in beverage) ; Escola v. Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 150 P. 2d 436 (1944); McClelland v. Acme
Brewing Co., 92 Cal. App. 2d 698, 207 P. 2d 591 (1949); Nichols v. Nold,
174 Kan. 613, 258 P. 2d 317 (1953), 38 A.L.R. 2d 887; Redmond v. Ouachita
Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 76 So. 2d 553 (La. App. 1954); Ryan v. Zweck-
Wollenberg Co., 266 Wis. 630, 64 N.W. 2d 226 (1954) (bursting bottle);Zarling v. La Salle Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 2 Wis. 2d 596, 87 N.W. 2d 263(1958); Weggeman v. Seven-Up Bottling Co., 5 Wis. 2d 503, 93 N.W. 2d 467(1958), 94 N.W. 2d 645 (1959).
22 See cases cited notes 16 and 17 supra.
23This trend is clearly demonstrated by the opinions in Sams v. Ezy-Way Food-
liner Co., 157 Me. 10, 170 A. 2d 160 (1961) ; Sofman v. Denham Food Serv.,
Inc., 37 N.J. 304, 181 A. 2d 168 (1962); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y. 2d 195,
213 N.Y.S. 2d 39 (1961); Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex.
609, 164 S.W. 2d 828 (1942).24 As pointed out in FRUmER & FRIEDMAN, op. cit. supra note 9, and HURsH, op.
cit. supra note 9.25 From the modest beginning more than a century ago in Thomas v. Winchester,
6 N.Y. 397 (1852), involving poison, by way of MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co., supra note 12, where a defectively mounted wheel caused the damage,
to Midwest Game Co. v. M.F.A. Milling Co., 320 S.W. 2d 547 (Mo. 1959),
where deficient fish food caused the death of certain trout.26 Hoenig v. Central Stamping Co., 247 App. Div. 895, 287 N.Y.S. 118, aff'd,
273 N.Y. 485, 6 N.E. 2d 415 (1936).
27 Farley v. Edward E. Tower Co., 271 Mass. 230, 171 N.E. 639 (1930), where
combs used by a beauty-parlor operator in giving plaintiff a "water wave"
burned plaintiff's head while plaintiff was under hair dryer. Under the cir-
cumstances, the combs could be described as inherently dangerous. Cf. Treacy
v. F. W. Woolworth Co., 253 App. Div. 899, 1 N.Y.S. 2d 919 (1938), where
combs exploded in plaintiff's hair. Contra, Smith v. S. S. Kresge Co., 79 F.
2d 361 (8th Cir. 1935).
1964-651
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"reasonably certain to place life or limb in peril,"28 though negligently
manufactured.
Although originally it was generally thought that the defective con-
dition of the product would have to cause personal injury,2  the more
recent and better rule is that recovery may be had for property damage
caused by such defective product.30 Logically enough, it has been held
that privity of contract is devoid of any significance where the liability
of the manufacturer for an injury caused by his product is to be de-
termined pursuant to the traditional principles of the law of tort, as in
Carter v. Yardley & Co."1 There, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts
said quite simply: "The time has come for us to recognize that the
asserted general rule [requiring privity] no longer exists. In principle
it was unsound. It tended to produce unjust results. It has been aban-
doned by the great weight of authority elsewhere. We now abandon
it in this Commonwealth.
32
In summary, then, the strict liability of the manufacturer, except
as to certain categories of products, is qualified by the requirement that
the plaintiff prove negligence, the dangerously defective characteristics
of the product which has injured him, and his damages in terms of a
financial amount. Even so, many jurisdictions, while having discarded
the so-called privity requirement in negligence cases, will allow such
defenses as due care, contributory negligence, and assumption of risk.33
These, it is safe to say, are dwindling.
III. STRICT LIABILITY AND WARRANTY
Following the lead of Winterbottorn v. Wright,3 4 the courts under-
took to shield the manufacturer from liability for damage resulting
from the sale and use of defectively made merchandise. By resorting
to the artificial strictures of the so-called privity "requirement," which
had not been considered in the earlier cases, many worthy and other-
wise legitimate causes of action were defeated. 35 The same "judicial
28 Timpson v. Marshall, Meadows & Stewart, Inc., 198 Misc. 1034, 101 N.Y.S.
2d 583, 585 (Sup. Ct. 1950); accord, Cook v. A. Garside & Sons, Inc., 145
Misc. 577, 259 N.Y.S. 947 (1932); Sherwood v. Lax & Abowitz, 145 Misc.
578, 259 N.Y.S. 948, aff'd without opinion, 239 App. Div. 799, 262 N.Y.S. 909
(1932).
29 It was so argued in Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11
N.Y. 2d 5, 226 N.Y.S. 2d 363 (1962).
30 Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply, Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90
N.W. 2d 873 (1958), where the court, speaking through Justice Voelker,
engages upon a comprehensive and discerning analysis of the case law.
31319 Mass. 92, 64 N.E. 2d 693 (1946), 164 A.L.R. 559.
32 64 N.E. 2d at 700.
33 Discussed by the court in Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Works Co.,
363 Mich. 235, 109 N.W. 2d 918 (1961).
34 10 Mees & W. 109, 11 L.J. Ex. 415, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
35 In the absence of privity, the courts declined to entertain any action based on
breach of warranty, even in food cases; e.g., Chysky v. Drake Bros. Co., 235
N.Y. 468, 139 N.E. 576 (1923). The case was criticized by judge Starke in
Parish v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 13 Misc. 2d 33, 177 N.Y.S. 2d 7 (N.Y.
Munic. Ct. 1958), and overruled by Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y. 2d 195,
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inventiveness ' ' 36 which first created the privity requirement is now
ascending to new heights to destroy it. A parallel process is discernible
in the United States Supreme Court's exhorting the inferior federal
tribunals to fashion a remedy3" in labor relations cases under the "na-
tional labor laws." 38
Borrowing a page from the judicial opinions dealing with the ab-
sence of privity in negligence cases,39 the courts, gradually at first, but
with an ever-increasing tempo, undertook to discard the privity re-
quirement entirely, or to circumvent it by indulging in fictions and
exceptions'.4 As might be expected, food and beverage sales constituted
the earliest departures from the doctrine of privity.4 ' As early as 1942,
213 N.Y.S. 2d 39 (1961), and Goldberg v. Kollsman Instrument Corp., 12
N.Y. 2d 432, 191 N.E. 2d 81 (1963).
36 This. expression was used by the Supreme Court of the United States in its
opinion in Textile Workers Union of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448
(1957).
3 7§ 301 [of the Labor-Management Relations Act, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C.§ 185 (1958)] is more than jurisdictional . .. [I]t authorizes federal courts to
fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of these collective bar-
gaining agreements. .. ." Id. at 450-51. "We conclude that the substantive law
to apply in suits under § 301 (a) is federal law, which the courts must fash-
ion from the policy of our national labor laws .... The Labor Management
Relations Act expressly furnishes some substantive law. It points out what
the parties may or may not do in certain situations. Other problems will lie in
the penumbra of express statutory mandates. Some will lack express statu-
tory sanction but will be solved by looking at the policy of the legislation
and fashioning a remedy that will effectuate that policy. The range of judicial
inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the problem." Id. at 456-57.
38 Setting an example for the lower courts, the Supreme Court's liberal con-
struction of federal labor law reached its apogee in a trilogy of cases: United
Steelworkers of America v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960) ; United
Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
and United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363
U.S. 593 (1960). See Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, siepra note 36,
discussed in Jaeger, Collective Labor Agreements and the Third Party Bene-ficiary, 1 B. C. IND. & CoM. L. REv. 125 (1960) ; see also JAEGER, LABOR LAW
chs. 1, 2 (1939); id. (Supp. 1959); JAEGER, COLLECTIVE LABOR AGREEMENTS
(1962).
39 See preceding section.4 0 The major departures from strict privity in warranty cases appear to fall
into one of the following categories: (1) The buyer is the agent of the
injured consumer; (2) the vendor is the agent of the manufacturer, or is a
conduit between the latter and the consumer; (3) the manufacturer who ad-
vertises extensively makes a general offer or warranty to those who use his
products; and finally (4) the consumer is the third party beneficiary of the
sales contract.
41 Klein v. Duchess Sandwich Co., 14 Cal. 2d 272, 93 P. 2d 799 (1939); Rubino
v. Utah Canning Co., 123 Cal. App. 2d 18, 266 P. 2d 163 (1954); Collum v.
Pope & Talbot, Inc., 135 Cal. App. 2d 653, 288 P. 2d 75 (1955); Cliett v.
Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1949); Florida Coca-Cola
Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 62 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1953) ; Tiffin v. Great At. & Pac.
Tea Co., 18 Ill. 2d 48, 162 N.E. 2d 406 (1959) ; Welter v. Bowman Dairy Co.,
318 Ill. App. 305, 47 N.E. 2d 739 (1943) ; Patargias v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
332 Ill. App. 117, 74 N.E. 2d 162 (1947) ; Sharpe v. Danville Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co., 9 Ill. App. 2d 175, 132 N.E. 2d 442 (1956); Davis v. Van Camp
Packing Co., 189 Iowa 775, 176 N.W. 382 (1920), 17 A.L.R. 649; Swengel v.
F. & E. Wholesale Grocery Co., 147 Kan. 555, 77 P. 2d 930 (1938); Nichols
v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613, 258 P. 2d 317 (1953), 38 A.L.R. 2d 887; Cernes v.
Pittsburgh Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 183 Kan. 758, 332 P. 2d 258 (1958); Le
Blanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60 So. 2d 873 (1952) ;
1964-651
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the Supreme Court of Texas did not hesitate to place its precedent-
breaking decision on grounds of public policy.
In Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps,"2 the court stated spe-
cifically: "We believe the better and sounder rule places liability solidly
on the ground of a warranty not in contract but imposed by law as a
matter of public policy."' 43 The various members of the Capps family
had partaken of certain summer sausage manufactured by Jacob E.
Decker and Sons, Inc. All who ate the sausage meat became ill and
one child died. Lack of privity was advanced as a defense, but the
Supreme Court of Texas rejected this contention and held the manu-
facturer liable. This is the pattern followed generally in foodstuffs and
beverage cases.4 4 Nor does it appear to make much difference whether
a tort theory or breach of warranty theory is advanced.45 In recent
years, similar protection has been extended to the consumer of drugs
and other pharmaceuticals, 46 cosmetics, and certain other chemical
products.
4 7
Under the statutes, 48 it has gradually been decided that the warranty
of fitness for a particular purpose and the warranty of merchantability
of food are to be assimilated. After all, the basic purpose of the pur-
chase of food by a consumer is consumption. In Sams v. Ezy-Way Food
Liner, Inc.49 the Supreme Court of Maine, speaking through its chief
justice, made this point very clear.5 ° The Uniform Commercial Code
likewise adopted this concept.51
Miller v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 70 So. 2d 409 (La App. 1954);
Sams v. Ezy-Way Foodliner Co., 157 Me. 10, 170 A. 2d 160 (1961); Rain-
water v. Hattiesburg Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 131 Miss. 315, 95 So. 444 (1923) ;
Biedenharn Candy Co. v. Moore, 184 Miss. 721, 186 So. 628 (1939); Seaton
Ranch Co. v. Montana Vegetable Oil & Feed Co., 123 Mont. 396, 217 P. 2d
549 (1950); Greenberg v. Lorenz, 9 N.Y. 2d 195, 213 N.Y.S. 2d 39 (1961);
Parish v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 13 Misc. 2d 33, 177 N.Y.S. 2d 7 (N.Y.
Munic. Ct. 1958) ; Cook v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 330 P. 2d 375 (Okla. 1958)
Nock v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works, 102 Pa. Super. 515, 156 A. 537 (1931);
Jacob E. Decker & Sons, Inc. v. Capps, 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828 (1942);
Campbell Soup Co. v. Ryan, 328 S.W. 2d 821 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Mazetti
v. Armour & Co., 75 Wash. 622, 135 Pac. 633 (1913); LaHue v. Coca-Cola
Bottling, Inc., 50 Wash. 2d 645, 314 P. 2d 421 (1957).
42 139 Tex. 609, 164 S.W. 2d 828 (1942).
43 Id. at 618, 164 S.W. 2d at 832.
44 See the discussion in Parish v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., supra note 35, and
Greenberg v. Lorenz, supra note 35.
45 Manzoni v. Detroit Coca-Cola Bottling Works, supra note 18.
46 Gottsdanker v. Cutter Laboratories, 182 Cal. App. 2d 602, 6 Cal. Rptr. 320
(1960).
47 Worley v. Proctor & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W. 2d 532(1952); Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co., 167 Ohio St. 244, 4 Ohio
Op. 2d 291, 147 N.E. 2d 612 (1958).
4sUniform Sales Act and Uniform Commercial Code.
49157 Me. 10, 170 A. 2d 160 (1961).
50" 'Reasonably fit for such purpose,' under Clause I, and 'merchantable quality,'
under Clause II, are equivalent with respect to food for human consumption.
The test is whether the food is fit to eat." Id. at 21, 170 A. 2d at 166.
' UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-314 [all references are to the 1962 Official
Text with comments], where there is a specific reference to food.
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A number of jurisdictions have considered that where the manu-
facturer advertises his product extensively-and certainly the radio and
television channels have greatly facilitated this mass advertising-the
remote purchaser may hold the manufacturer on his representations.
An early case recognizing this principle is Baxter v. Ford Motor Co.
5 2
Here, plaintiff lost an eye when the shatter-proof [?] windshield on
his Ford automobile shattered; he brought his action against the
manufacturer and dealer. The trial court directed a verdict for the
manufacturer, and on appeal this was reversed. The Supreme Court
of Washington held it to be error for the trial court to have excluded
certain catalogues and other printed matter furnished to the dealer,
which the dealer had distributed, and upon which Baxter had relied in
purchasing the Ford. The court seemed inclined to regard the repre-
sentations made in the sales brochures as an express warranty. The
breach of this warranty afforded an adequate basis for recovery.5 3
In addition to mass advertising by radio and television, the courts
have recognized that representations made in labels or tags, leaflets,
pamphlets, or brochures have a similar effect and should be similarly
treated.54 In the original Baxter opinion there is a considerable dis-
cussion of Mazetti v. Armour & Co.5 5 In the latter, strict liability was
imposed upon the manufacturer in a food product case. However, in
contradistinction to the Baxter case, the warranty in Mazetti was im-
plied. Again, public policy was the basis, not tort liability.
Two cases, Rogers v. Toni Home Permanent Co.5 6 and Worley v.
Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co.,5 7 argue that the courts should recognize
the realities of modern mass merchandising; it is unsound and unjust
to permit the manufacturer to persuade the consumer to buy his product
by means of mass advertising and then deny the consumer the right to
recover in the event the goods fail to correspond to representations
made. Assimilated thereto is Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyana-
mid Co.58 Here, in addition to advertising, there were certain tags or
labels affixed to the cloth (which had been treated with resin) repre-
senting that it was shrinkproof. Again the court emphasized mass ad-
vertising and mass distribution and contended that under these changing
times and conditions the ancient defense of privity should be discarded
in toto. In Mannsz v. A1acwhyte Co.5 9 the court indicated that there
may be liability for breach of a representation contained in an adver-
tising circular, even without proof of the plaintiff's decedent ever
52168 Wash. 456, 12 P. 2d 409 (1932).
53 The Baxter case is often cited and quoted since it represents an early de-
parture from the inhibiting stricture of privity.
54Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., supra note 29.
55 75 Wash. 622, 133 Pac. 633 (1913).5e 167 Ohio St. 244, 4 Ohio Op. 2d 291, 147 N.E. 2d 612 (1958).
5 241 Mo. App. 1114, 253 S.W. 2d 532 (1952).
58 11 N.Y. 2d 5, 226 N.Y.S. 2d 363 (1962).
59 155 F. 2d 445 (3d Cir. 1946).
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having seen or relied upon the representation. From an examination of
these cases it seems clear that where extensive advertising has resulted
in certain representations to the public, sound policy considerations
require the imposition of an absolute liability upon the manufacturer.
Another theory that the courts have indulged in is that of regarding
the dealer or distributor as the mere conduit or channel through which
the contract is made. In General Motors Corp. v. Dodson" the court
held that an express warranty had been made by the manufacturer as
to a certain automobile that was being sold. In Shanklin Pier, Ltd. v.
Betel Products, Ltd.,61 defendant's representative told plaintiff's director
and architect that two coats of a certain type of preservative manu-
factured by defendant would be adequate for repainting a pier owned
by the plaintiff. The architect was shown a brochure concerning the
paint and told that the preservative would have a life of at least seven
to ten years. The plaintiff specified two coats of the preservative in
its contract for the repair and repainting of the pier. The contractor
purchased the paint and applied it. It proved quite unsatisfactory and
plaintiff sued manufacturer for damages for breach of an express war-
ranty. The contention that no action for breach of warranty would lie,
except between the parties to the sales contract wherein the warranty
was made, was rejected by the court. If the manufacturer made an
affirmation of fact about his product intended to induce the purchase
of it from some third party, then the manufacturer must be held to have
made an express warranty upon which the third party may rely; and
upon breach thereof, a cause of action accrues to the remote vendee.6"
Two other cases which recognize this theory of recovery are Stude-
baker Corp. v. Nail63 and Spartanburg Hotel Corp. v. Alexander Smith,
Inc." In the Nail case,.a customer was furnished with the manufac-
turer's printed "Standard Warranty." When the automobile he pur-
chased proved defective, the customer brought this action against the
manufacturer. 5 The court concluded that the dealer was the manufac-
turer's agent for purposes of delivering the warranty to the customer.6 6
The court simply found that the warranty had been made expressly
and directly to the customer. Similarly in the Spartanburg Hotel
case,67 a carpet wholesaler had made certain representations regard-
ing the carpet's quality to a prospective customer. When the sale
was made, it was billed through a local furniture firm, since the whole-
60 338 S.W. 2d 655 (Tenn. App. 1960).
61 [19511 2 K.B. 854.
62 See 2 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTS § 378A (3d ed. Jaeger rev. 1958), where the
rights of third party beneficiaries in connection with warranties are dis-
cussed.63 82 Ga. App. 779, 62 S.E. 2d 198 (1950).
64231 S.C. 1, 97 S.E. 2d 199 (1957).
65 General Motors Corp. v. Dodson, 338 S.W. 2d 655 (Tenn. App. 1960).
66 62 S.E. 2d at 200.
67 231 S.C. 1, 97 S.E. 2d 199 (1957).
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saler could not sell directly. Here again, it was concluded that the sale
was a direct one from the wholesaler to the hotel and that the method
of settlement adopted had no significance. Quoting from the Nail case,68
the court noted that the evidence would permit the finding that the
wholesaler had made an oral express warranty directly to the hotel.,9
In United States Pipe & Foundry Co. v. City of Waco,7 0 a pipe manu-
facturer and a contractor convinced the city to specify new and cheaper
pipe produced by the manufacturer as a substitute for the customary cast
iron pipe which the city could not afford. Numerous oral representa-
tions were made regarding the capacity of the pipe. When the contractor
was awarded the contract to install the pipe, he purchased it from the
manufacturer. The pipe soon proved not to possess the necessary ca-
pacity, and the city sued the manufacturer, contractor, and engineer for
damages based upon breach of express warranty. The Supreme Court
of Texas affirmed the judgment of the courts below for the city.71 In
Odell v. Frueh ' 2 there was a similar situation where the manufacturer
had made certain representations concerning his product to officials of
the school district and the architect. The contractor bought these ma-
terials from the manufacturer, but was held entitled to recover from
the manufacturer for breach of express warranty, although the war-
ranty had not been made to him.
A subpurchaser was denied recovery in Fleenor v. Erikson.7 3 While
recognizing the right to recover from a manufacturer for breach of
express warranty, the court found that the statements attributed to the
sales representative were actually made after the contract had been
concluded. Since no new consideration had been shown, the Supreme
Court of Washington affirmed the trial court's judgment for the de-
fendant manufacturer. 74 However, the court also found that lack of
privity would not have been a substantial basis for denying recovery
to a subpurchaser in a suit grounded on breach of an express warranty.
In passing, it might be noted that were the Fleenor case to be decided
under the Uniform Commercial Code,75 it is probable that an opposite
decision would be reached.7 6
Holding conversely, the High Court of Australia in International
6882 Ga. App. 779, 62 S.E. 2d 198 (1950).
69 97 S.E. 2d at 202.
70130 Tex. 126, 108 S.W. 2d 432, cert. denied, 302 U.S. 749 (1937).
71 Ibid.
72 146 Cal. App. 2d 504, 304 P. 2d 45 (1956).
73 35 Wash. 2d 891, 215 P. 2d.885 (1950).
74 Ibid.
75 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-213; cf. § 2-207.
76 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-313, comment 7, reads: "The precise time
when words... of affirmation are made ... is not material.... [I]f language
is used after the closing of a deal . . . the warranty becomes a modification
and need not be supported by consideration." This, of course, changes the
common law; see 1 WILLISTON, CoNTRACTs ch. 6 (3d ed. Jaeger rev. 1957),
dealing with consideration.
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Harvester Co. of Australia PTY., Ltd. v. Carrigan's Hazeldene Pastoral
Co. 77 expressly rejected the argument that the local dealer was the
agent of the manufacturer of a hay baler which proved unsatisfactory.
An action for breach of express warranty was held not to lie against
the manufacturer.
IV. CIGARETTES, CANCER AND STRICT LIABILITY: A CASE STUDY
It is probable that there is no area of products liability which is so
opaque and confused, and where the extent of the manufacturer's
responsibility for injury is in so much doubt, as in the case of tobacco
products, especially cigarettes. While there is no doubt today that the
great majority of jurisdictions hold the manufacturer strictly, if not
absolutely, liable for purveying unwholesome food, it is only quite
recently that cigarettes have been treated as analogous.
One of the most recent decisions makes the manufacturer's liability
more nearly absolute than has been the case heretofore. In Green v.
American Tobacco Co.,7 8 the Supreme Court of Florida in a lucid and
far-reaching opinion by Chief Justice E. Harris Drew expressly re-
jected foreseeability as an appropriate test in determining the manu-
facturer's liability.
Originally, the widow of the deceased cigarette smoker and the ad-
ministrator of his estate brought an action against the manufacturer of
Lucky Strike cigarettes which had caused lung cancer from which death
resulted. Among the various theories of liability on which the action was
based, only two survived defendant manufacturer's motion for a di-
rected verdict. These were breach of implied warranty and negligence,
as to which the jury was instructed:
The manufacture of products which are offered for sale to the
public in their original package for human consumption or use
impliedly warrants that its products are reasonably wholesome
or fit for the purpose for which they are sold, but such implied
warranty does not cover substances in the manufactured product,
the harmful effects of which no developed human skill or fore-
sight can afford knowledge."9
The Lucky Strike cigarettes used by decedent were found to be the
cause of his cancer, but the jury also found that it was not possible
for defendant manufacturer to know that its cigarettes would be the
cause. Accordingly, judgment was given for defendant manufacturer.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the
manufacturer should not be held liable where no developed human skill
or foresight could afford knowledge of the ultimately injurious conse-
quences.80 A forceful and carefully reasoned dissent, based on a pene-
77 32 A.L.J.R. 160 (Austl. 1958).
78 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963).
79 325 F. 2d 673, 676 (5th Cir. 1963).
80 304 F. 2d 70 (5th Cir. 1962).
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trating analysis of Florida precedents,"' together with a petition for
rehearing, induced the court to refer the case to the Supreme Court of
Florida for an answer to the question being certified :82
'Does the law of Florida impose on a manufacturer and dis-
tributor of cigarettes absolute liability, as for breach of implied
warranty, for death caused by using such cigarettes from 1924
or 1925 until February 1, 1956, the cancer having developed prior
to February 1, 1956, and the death occurring February 25, 1958,
when the defendant manufacturer and distributor could not on,
or prior to, February 1, 1956, by the reasonable application of
human skill and foresight, have known that users of such ciga-
rettes would be endangered, by the inhalation of the main stream
smoke from such cigarettes of contracting cancer of the lung?' 3
The high court of Florida ruled that the manufacturer's actual
knowledge or opportunity to obtain knowledge of a defective or un-
wholesome condition is wholly irrelevant to his liability on the theory
of implied warranty. The court declared that the Florida decisions s4
conclusively established this principle and that the question certified must
therefore be answered in the affirmative.
It might have been assumed that upon receiving the answer to its
question, the Fifth Circuit would have simply remanded the case to
the district court for determination of damages. Defendant manufac-
turer argued that a verdict should be directed in its favor since there
was no evidence that Lucky Strikes are not reasonably fit for human
consumption. However, the majority adopted a different course and
observed that the jury had not made a sufficient finding on the question
of reasonableness; that is, "whether or not the cigarettes were 'reason-
ably fit and wholesome.' "85
The court then noted that the jury had found that "the smoking of
Lucky Strike cigarettes on the part of the decedent, Green, was a
proximate cause of the development of cancer in his left lung which
8" Including Cliett v. Lauderdale Biltmore Corp., 39 So. 2d 476 (Fla. 1949) ; Sencer
v. Carl's Markets, Inc., 45 So. 2d 671 (Fla. 1950); Florida Coca-Cola Bot-
tling Co. v. Jordan, 62 So. 2d 910 (Fla. 1953); Hopkins v. Jackson Grain
Co., 63 So. 2d 514 (Fla. 1953); Miami Coca-Cola Bottling Co., Inc. v. Todd,
101 So. 2d 34 (Fla. 1958) ; Carter v. Hector Supply Co., 128 So. 2d 390 (Fla.
1961).
Authorities cited from other jurisdictions in the dissenting opinion are:
Arnaud's Restaurant, Inc. v. Cotter, 212 F. 2d 883 (5th Cir. 1954), cert.
denied, 348 U.S. 915 (1955); Doyle v. Fuerst & Kraemer, 129 La. 838, 56 So.
906 (1911); LeBlanc v. Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 221 La. 919, 60
So. 2d 873 (1952).
82 procedure was authorized by FLA. STAT. ANN. § 25.031 (1961).
83 154 So. 2d at 170.
84Including Berger v. Berger, 76 Fla. 503, 80 So. 296 (1918); Smith v. Bur-
dine's, Inc., 144 Fla. 500, 198 So. 223 (1940); Blanton v. Cudahy Packing
Co., 154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944) ; Lambert v. Sistrunk, 58 So. 2d 434(Fla. 1952) ; Food Fair Stores v. Macurda, 93 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1957) ; Carter
v. Hector Supply Co., supra note 81; Sencer v. Carl's Markets, Inc., supra
note 81.
s5 325 F. 2d at 677.
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caused his death. '8 6 However, the court suggested that the jury's find-
ings might be "consistent with the standard of reasonableness, ' '87 quot-
ing its earlier opinion in Lartigue v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. :88
"Strict liability on the warranty of wholesomeness, without regard to
negligence, 'does not mean that goods are warranted to be foolproof
or incapable of producing injury.'"
The same circuit judge who had dissented in the earlier opinion89
now concurred in part and dissented in part, stating: "The majority
opinion in this case is a careful and accurate portrayal of the status of
the case as it now stands before us. And it is a correct interpretation
of the holding of the Supreme Court of Florida. . . . I cannot join,
however, in its conclusion that we should not render judgments for
plaintiffs on the issue of liability."90
Dissenting Judge Cameron then took his brethren to task for su'g-
gesting that Lartigue was an authoritative precedent for its opinion in
the Green case, particularly with regard to the quotation which, says
the dissenting opinion, is taken out of context: "It is fair to say, I
think, that the majority's entire reliance on Lartigue and the principles
it stands for are in direct conflict with the decisions of Florida courts,
including the specific holding of its Supreme Court in its answer to the
question we certified to it ... "91
What makes the majority opinion especially difficult to understand
is that the Lartigue decision was handed down some six weeks before
the Florida court's opinion in Green was filed. It is open to conjecture
whether the Lartigue case truly represents Louisiana law, which the
s6 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88317 F. 2d 19,37 (5th Cir. 1963).
89 304 F. 2d at 77.
90 325 F. 2d at 679.
91 Id. at 680, citing 154 So. 2d at 172-73. The dissent continues:
"The majority here finds itself, I submit with deference, in the anomalous
position of resting its decision as to the most crucial point in this case upon
Lartigue, which in turn went astray because it bottomed its holding on the
portion (304 F. 2d at 73-77) of this Court's original opinion which was re-
jected by the Florida Supreme Court upon our submission to it. The vital
language of Lartigue (317 F. 2d 37-39) was based upon, and in considerable
part repeated, these rejected holdings of this Court's original opinion.
"It follows, it therefore seems to me, that whatever may be the force of
Lartigue--decided two months before the Florida Supreme Court answered our
question-in deciding a Louisiana case, it is no authority at all in this case based
upon Florida law. Under that law it is not true that 'By and large, the standard
of safety of the goods is the same under the warranty theory as under the
negligence theory.' The direct opposite is true. The instruction given by the
court below and its accompanying Question No. 4 were predicated directly
upon the negligence theory. Florida rejects that theory and holds that sales of
goods for human consumption are not covered by the law of sales with its
caveat enptor or the law of negligence with its doctrines of reasonable care.
Instead, they are controlled entirely by the law of contracts. The contract here
was between the Tobacco Company and Green. The warranty embodied by the
law in every sale the Company made to him was that the cigarettes purchased
by him would not do him harm."
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federal court was supposed to be applying. In one particular, this would
seem not open to question; said the Fifth Circuit quite aptly: "Louisiana
courts were quick to get around the notion of privity as a necessary
element in holding a manufacturer liable on his warranty .... Making
an Erie [R.R. v. Tompkins92] educated guess, we hold that... Louisi-
ana courts would classify cigarettes with food and drink."93 The latter
statement seems to express the general view as to the status of tobacco
products.9 4
But before taking leave of Lady Nicotine, and to emphasize the con-
fusion that attends the law of implied warranty in this field, a short
resum6 of the rather curious decision in Pritchard v. Liggett & Myers
Tobacco Co.95 will be undertaken.06 Plaintiff Pritchard had been smoking
Chesterfield cigarettes for more than thirty years and had relied on
numerous representations and assurances by the manufacturer that the
"nose, throat and accessory organs" are "not adversely affected by
smoking Chesterfields. '97 Many similar statements emphasizing the
innocuous nature of Chesterfields were made on television commercials
and published in various periodicals.98 The United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissed the action and the
plaintiff, who was suffering from cancer of the lung, appealed. An
examination of the Pennsylvania cases9" was undertaken by the Third
Circuit (as diversity of citizenship requires), and the trial court's judg-
ment was reversed and the case remanded on the ground that there
were jury questions:
From the evidence, the jury could very well have concluded
that there was a breach of an implied warranty of merchantabil-
ity....
In Pennsylvania, one who supplies a product to another and
knows or should know that the foreseeable use is dangerous to
human life unless certain precautions are taken, and who realizes
or should realize that the user will not in the exercise of reason-
able vigilance recognize the danger, is under a duty to warn the
user of such consequences and to advise proper precautions. 0 0
92 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
93 317 F. 2d at 35.
94 The cases cited are in Jaeger, Products Liability--Tobacco, General Practice
Section, A.B.A. Newsletter, 1964, vol. 1, no. 3, pp. 1, 2.
95 295 F. 2d 292 (3d Cir. 1961).
96 Discussed in Jaeger, Privity of Warranty: Has the Tocsin Sounded? 1
DUQUESNE L. REv. 1 (1963).
97 295 F. 2d at 296-97, where verbatim quotations appear in the opinion.
98 Including Life, Saturday Evening Post, Time, and The Pittsburgh Press.
99 Magee v. General Motors Corp., 124 F. Supp. 606 (W.D. Pa. 1954), aff'd per
curianm, 220 F. 2d 270 (3d Cir. 1955); Foley v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Co.,
363 Pa. 1, 68 A. 2d 517, 530-34 (1949); Caskie v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co.,
373 Pa. 614, 96 A. 2d 901, 903 (1953).
109 295 F. 2d at 297-99, citing Hopkins v. E. I. Dupont De Nemours & Co., 199
F. 2d 930 (3d Cir. 1952) ; Maize v. Atlantic Ref. Co., 352 Pa. 51, 41 A. 2d 850(1945), 160 A.L.R. 449; RESTATEiENT, TORTS § 388 (1934).
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And in a separate concurring opinion, the following appears:
If a manufacturer assures his potential public that his product
is harmless and it is proved that it is not harmless, he can be held,
no doubt, for breach of warranty. [101] And when a person makes
to another a statement of fact which he does not know to be true,
intending that the other shall act in reliance on the truth of that
statement, he is liable for negligent misrepresentation. 02
Upon remand, the trial lasted for some six weeks. The case was
then submitted to the jury on interrogatories, to which the following
answers were made: (1) Smoking Chesterfield cigarettes caused the
plaintiff's cancer; (2) defendant manufacturer was not negligent; (3)
the plaintiff had given timely notice that he intended to treat his injury
as having been caused by defendant company's breach of warranty.
The jury alsoL found that no express warranty had been made (this in
spite of the many assurances that Chesterfields were "harmless") and
that there was no breach of implied warranty. Finally, the plaintiff was
found to have assumed the risk of injury by smoking. It does seem
curious that if there was no breach of warranty, the jury found that
notice of such a breach was timely.10 3
In Ross v. Philip Morris & Co., 0 4 the most recent decision of any
moment dealing with cigarettes, the plaintiff had been smoking Philip
Morris for some twenty years, his use increasing to three and four
packages a day. In 1952, he was operated on for cancer and brought
this action based on implied warranty under the law of Missouri.
From a judgment for the manufacturer in the trial court, the
plaintiff appealed, alleging breach of implied warranty. On the defense
of privity, the court cited and discussed Morrow v. Caloric Appliance
Corp.,0 5 where the Supreme Court of Missouri, en banc, "struck down
the privity requirement rule which had previously been applied in
Missouri." 1" On appeal, the plaintiff argued that under Missouri law
the manufacturer of cigarettes owes the ultimate consumer an "absolute
duty" to have its product "fit and wholesome for human consumption."
Also, it was contended that the manufacturer is "absolutely liable," is
"an insurer of the fitness and wholesomeness of its product," and acts
at its peril, regardless of knowledge, "actual or constructive," and "even
regardless of the possibility or impossibility of the manufacturer ob-
taining knowledge, that its product contains harmful, dangerous, dele-
terious or carcinogenic substances and ingredients."'0 ° Green v. Ameri-
101 Citing PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 2-313 (Supp. 1960) ; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 2-313; UNIFORM SALES AcT § 12.
202 295 F. 2d at 301-02.
103 It appears that further motions were made following the judgment (1) to
amend, and (2) for a partial new trial. These are discussed in Jaeger, supra
note 96, n. 28.
104 328 F. 2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964).
105 372 S.W. 2d 41 (Mo. 1963).
'or 328 F. 2d at 7.
107 Ibid.
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can Tobacco Company0 s was largely the basis for these claims of the
plaintiff.
But the trial court specifically refused to follow the Supreme Court
of Florida in its Green opinion and this was partly the basis for the
appellant's brief. The Eighth Circuit did not feel that the Supreme
Court of Missouri "would blindly follow Florida law on this subject-
if such law should (as it has) subsequently turn out to be contrary to
the first enunciations by the Fifth Circuit."' 0
9
In conservative judicial vein, the court made a modest appraisal of
the situation when it said:
The field of implied warranty is in a state of flux, and it is
obvious that Missouri has joined the liberal trend toward allow-
ing recovery from a manufacturer for breach of such a warranty
under factual situations once governed by the rigid caveat emptor
doctrine-let the buyer beware. However, after exhaustive study
of all relevant Missouri authorities [110], we are convinced that,
on the facts of this case, the trial court correctly charged the
jury and properly refused plaintiff's instruction which would
have made defendant an absolute insurer-without regard to
'reasonableness' and without regard to 'developed human skill or
foresight."" (Emphasis added.)
The court considered "a vast array" of non-judicial authorities,
including the Restatement of Torts where the rule of absolute liability
is qualified by a statement that it "applies only where the defective
condition of the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the con-
sumer."" 12 Finding itself limited solely to a determination of the ap-
plicable Missouri law, the court summarized: "Under such law, a
manufacturer, in the proper factual situation, is held as an absolute
insurer against knowable dangers, and thus has an incentive to keep
abreast of scientific knowledge."'
V. NOTICE OF BRiFCa OF WARRANTY
Iin the preceding sections, considerable space has been devoted to
the limitation of the manufacturer's liability occasioned by the strict
108 154 So. 2d 169 (Fla. 1963) ; see also Florida cases cited notes 81 and 84 supra.
109 The court added: "Indeed . . . this case is to be decided under Missouri law,
and neither the Green case, the Lartigue case (which approved a similar in-
struction as is controverted here), nor the Pritchard case (which also used
a similar instruction below and is now again on appeal) is dispositive or de-
cisive of the present controversy." 328 F. 2d at 12. (Emphasis added.)
110 Including Morrow v. Caloric Appliance Corp., supra note 105; Holyfield v.
Joplin Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 170 S.W. 2d 451 (Mo. App. 1943); Carter v.
St. Louis Dairy Co., 139 S.W. 2d 1025 (Mo. App. 1940) ;Bell v. S. S. Kresge
Co., 129 S.W. 2d 932 (Mo. App. 1939); Fantroy v. Schirmer, 296 S.W. 235
(Mo. App. 1927); Worley v. Procter & Gamble Mfg. Co., 241 Mo. App. 1114,
253 S.W. 532 (1952); Midwest Game Co. v. M. F. A. Milling Co., 320 S.W.
2d 547 (Mo. 1959); Albers Milling Co. v. Carney, 341 S.W. 2d 117 (Mo.
1960) ; Borman v. O'Donley, 364 S.W. 2d 31 (Mo. App. 1962).
"' 328 F. 2d at 12.
112 RESTATEMENT (SECOND), TORTS § 402A (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1962).
113 328 F. 2d at 13.
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application of privity. Now, a further limitation-the necessity of giving
timely notice of the breach of warranty in order to hold the vendor-
will be considered. At common law, the decisions were far from uni-
form as to the effect of acceptance and retention of goods which had
been sold upon the right of action for breach of warranty." 4 It was
basically a question of fact as to whether acceptance of defective goods
amounted to a waiver of the rights of the buyer, especially in regard
to breach of warranty.1 5
Today, both the Uniform Sales Act and the Uniform Commercial
Code require the buyer to give notice to the vendor of a breach of
warranty within "a reasonable time" after he discovers or should have
discovered a breach. The pertinent provision of the Uniform Sales Act
reads:
In the absence of express or implied agreement of the parties,
acceptance of the goods by the buyer shall not discharge the seller
from liability in damages or other legal remedy for breach of
any promise or warranty in the contract to sell or the sale. But
if, after acceptance of the goods, the buyer fail to give notice
to the seller of the breach of any promise or warranty within a
reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought to know of such
breach, the seller shall not be liable theref or.1 6
Of the aforequoted provision, Professor Williston observes:
This section of the Statute treats the seller's tender of the goods
as an offer of them in full satisfaction, but the buyer is allowed
a reasonable time for accepting the offer. Moreover, if he declines
to take the goods in full satisfaction he need not return them.
The practical advantages of the statutory rule and its ease and
certainty of application commend it.1 7
A rather strict interpretation given this provision of the Uniform
Sales Act in some jurisdictions to the effect that the nature of the de-
fect, the damage caused thereby, and the intent to hold the vendor liable
would have to be disclosed in the notice" 8 led to a change in terminology
114 WILLISTON, SALES §§ 488, 489 (rev. ed. 1948), for an elaborate citation of
the authorities.
115 North Alaska Co. v. Hobbs, Wall & Co., 159 Cal. 380, 120 Pac. 27 (1911).
In Reininger v. Eldon Mfg. Co., 114 Cal. App. 2d 240, 250 P. 2d 4 (1952),
the court said: "Prior to the Uniform Sales Act it was a pure question of fact
whether the receipt and retention by the buyer was made in such a way as
to indicate he was assenting to the tender of nonconforming goods. It has
never been the law in California that mere acceptance of defective goods
with knowledge of their defects cuts off a buyer's right of action for breach
of an express warranty as a matter of law ...... 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 714 (3d ed. Jaeger-rev. 1961).
2
1 6 UNIFORZA SALES ACT § 49. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 412 (1932) reads:
"Under a contract for the sale of goods, the failure of the buyer, after
acceptance of goods tendered as performance of the contract, to give notice
to the seller of the latter's breach of any promise or warranty, within a
reasonable time after the buyer knows or has reason to know of such breach,
discharges the seller's duty to make compensation."
117 5 WILLISTON, Op. cit. supra note 115, at 399.
118 The purpose of the notice requirement, as the courts have signalized, "is to
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of the comparable Uniform Commercial Code provision which reads:
(3) Where a tender has been accepted
(a) the buyer must within a reasonable time after he dis-
covers or should have discovered any breach notify the
seller of breach or be barred from any remedy .... 119
It is clear that the Code intends to liberalize the notice requirement,
especially to preserve the rights of non-commercial buyers who can
hardly be expected to be aware of technical niceties. 20 However, under
either statute the quantitative element in the question "what is a reason-
able time ?" will, it is safe to predict, continue to plague the courts, as
the case law so abundantly indicates."'
advise the seller that he must meet a claim for damages, as to which, rightly
or wrongly, the law requires that he shall have an early warning." American
Mfg. Co. v. United States Shipping Bd., 7 F. 2d 565 (2d Cir. 1925) (L. Hand,
J.), quoted with approval in Columbia Axle Co. v. American Auto Ins. Co.,
63 F. 2d 206 (6th Cir. 1933), in Whitefield v. Jessup, 31 Cal. 2d 826, 193
P. 2d 1 (1948), and in Reininger v. Eldon Mfg. Co., 114 Cal. App. 2d 240, 250
P. 2d 4 (1952).
119 UNIFORM COMMaERCIAL CODE § 2-607(3) (a).
120 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-607, comment, reads: "Purpose of Changes:
To continue the prior basic policies with respect to acceptance of goods while
making a number of minor though material changes in the interest of simpli-
city and commercial convenience ....
"The time of notification is to be determined by applying commercial
standards to a merchant buyer. 'A reasonable time' for notification from a
retail consumer is to be judged by different standards so that in his case it will
be extended, for the rule of requiring notification is designed to defeat com-
mercial bad faith, not to deprive a good faith consumer of his remedy.
"The content of the notification need merely be sufficient to let the seller
know that the transaction is still troublesome and must be watched ....
Indicative of the greater liberality with respect to notice which the Uni-
form Commercial Code imports into the law is § 1-201: "General Definitions
"(25) A person has 'notice' of a fact when
(a) he has actual knowledge of it; or(b) he has received a notice or notification of it; or
(c) from all the facts and circumstances known to him at the time in
question he has reason to know that it exists."
For a general discussion of notice in its many implications, see 6 WILLISTON,
CONTRACrs § 887B (3d ed. Jaeger rev. 1962).
121 United States v. Dewart Milk Prod. Co., 300 Fed. 448 (M.D. Pa. 1924),
construing Pennsylvania act-10 month's delay discoverable by inspection is
unreasonable; Ruggles v. Buffalo Foundry & Mach. Co., 27 F. 2d 234 (6th
Cir. 1928), applying Michigan act-a year's delay in giving notice in a con-
tract for sale of a brine evaporator is unreasonable; Owen v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 273 F. 2d 140 (9th Cir. 1959), delay of 2 years in giving notice that
shirt was defective held unreasonable.
Elkus Co. v. Voeckel, 27 Ariz. 332, 233 Pac. 57 (1925), where goods to
retailer contained a defect not readily discoverable, notice given as soon as
retailer received complaints from customers was reasonable; Mutual Electric
Co. v. Turner Eng. Co., 230 Mich. 63, 202 N.W. 964 (1925), delay of several
years held not excessive as a matter of law, in view of constant efforts to
obviate cause of complaint; Stewart v. Menzel, 181 Minn. 347, 232 N.W. 522(1930), delay of 6 months in giving notice of defects in fur coat unreason-
able; Laundry Service Co. v. Fidelity Laundry Mach. & Eng'r Co., 187 Minn.
180, 245 N.W. 36 (1932), delay of 5 months in discovery and claiming de-
fects in laundry machine held unreasonable.
Mastin v. Boland, 178 App. Div. 421, 165 N.Y.S. 468 (1917), 3 weeks
held reasonable when the buyer did not know the seller's name and address;
1964-651
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
VI. EXCLUSION OF MANUFACTURER'S LIABILITY: DISCLAIMER
There is another significant limitation on the liability of the manu-
facturer for breach of warranty: express exclusion by the use of an
integration clause or an express disclaimer. At common law, this was
regarded as an exercise of the freedom of contract. However, in more
recent times the courts have been less inclined to extend such limiting
provisions beyond the precise words used to limit liability.1 2 Of late,
some jurisdictions have even declined on grounds of public policy to
enforce disclaimers, especially in contracts of adhesion. 23
The Uniform Sales Act did not have a specific provision dealing
with disclaimers, as does the Uniform Commercial Code,124 but there
is a general section which authorizes disclaimers. 25 The Uniform Com-
mercial Code, as pointed out in a recent comprehensive and well-
documented article by Professor Cudahy,126 makes specific provision
for disclaimers:
. (1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express
warranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit war-
ranty shall be construed wherever reasonable as consistent with
each other; but subject to the provisions of this Article on parol
or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-202) negation or limitation is
inoperative to the extent that such construction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the im-
plied warranty of merchantability or any part of it the language
must mention merchantability and in case of a writing must be
Ficklen Tobacco Co. v. Friedberg, 196 App. Div. 409, 187 N.Y.S. 561 (1925),
a year is an unreasonable time; Stone v. Bleim, 176 N.Y.S. 25 (Sup. Ct. 1919),
10 days not unreasonable as matter of law; Pierce Foundation Corp. Co. v.
Eagle Pipe Supply Co., 180 N.Y.S. 88 (Sup. Ct. 1920), 4 months held un-
reasonable; Kaufman v. Levy, 102 Misc. 689, 169 N.Y.S. 454 (Sup. Ct. 1918),
notice given immediately after examination of the goods held unreasonable
when examination was deferred for 23 days, where it was customary to
examine goods within 10 days; Gleason v. Lebolt, 126 Misc. 216, 212 N.Y.S.
227 (Sup. Ct. 1925), 5 months' delay in discovering defect in diamond and
giving notice is reasonable as matter of law.
Walsterholme v. Randall, 295 Pa. 131, 144 Atl. 909 (1929), notice after 11
days reasonable even though material had to be manufactured into cloth
within that period; Bodek v. Avrack, 297 Pa. 225, 146 Atl. 546 (1929), 3
months as matter of law unreasonable in sale of blankets; Kull v. General
Motors Truck Co., 311 Pa. 580, 155 Atl. 562 (1933), notice of breach of war-
ranty as to age of trucks given 2 years after sale held barred by laches;
Patterson Foundry Co. v. Williams Lacquer Co., 52 R.I. 149, 158 Atl. 721
(1932), delay of 6 months in giving notice of defects in lacquer grinding
mill held unreasonable.
122 4 WILLISTON, CO NTRACTs §§ 602A, 626 (3d ed. Jaeger rev. 1960).
123 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 67, 27 Cal. Rptr: 697,
377 P. 2d 897 (1963); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 37 Cal. Rptr. 896,
391 P. 2d 168 (1964); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358,
161 A. 2d 69 (1960); State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co. v. Anderson-Weber,
252 Iowa 1289, 110 N.W. 2d 449 (1961).
124 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-316: "Exclusion or Modification of War-
ranties."
125 UNIFORM SALES AcT § 71.
126 Cudahy, Limitation of Warranty Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 47
MARQ. L. REv. 127 (1963).
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conspicuous, and to exclude or modify any implied warranty of
fitness the exclusion must be by a writing and conspicuous .... 7
CONCLUSION
From the recent cases heretofore discussed, it is apparent that the
manufacturer's liability is becoming ever stricter, regardless of the
theory upon which recovery is based. The cases are primarily significant
because they indicate a current and growing trend. However, even with
the increased protection afforded the purchaser or consumer, strict lia-
bility is-by no means absolute liability, since there are still a variety
of defenses available to the manufacturer.
1 2 7 UNIFORM COMMERcIAL CODE § 2-316.
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